Iran

https://www.aviation-defence-universe.com/a-region-on-the-brink-how-a-fragile-ceasefire-shapes-west-asias-future/ A Region on the Brink: How a Fragile Ceasefire Shapes West Asia’s Future Hits 128 • Ceasefire Without Closure: Inside the High-Stakes US–Iran Standoff • Strait of Hormuz at the Centre: Diplomacy, Deterrence, and a Region in Flux • Failed Venue of Talks between US & Iran : Pakistan By Jai Kumar Verma New Delhi. 20 April 2026. As tensions between Washington and Tehran escalated into a dangerous phase of open confrontation, West Asia found itself on the brink of a wider conflict with global implications. What began as targeted military strikes quickly evolved into a multi-actor regional crisis, drawing in key Gulf states and raising alarm over the security of the strategically vital Strait of Hormuz. In this volatile backdrop, a fragile two-week ceasefire emerged—not as a resolution, but as a temporary pause in hostilities. The negotiations that led to this uneasy truce reflected a complex interplay of military pressure, economic concerns, and entrenched geopolitical rivalries, underscoring how close the region had come to a far more destructive confrontation. The Author The diplomatic push behind these talks was driven by urgent, overlapping priorities. Foremost was the need to avert a full-scale war that could engulf the Middle East and destabilize international security. Equally pressing was the imperative to steady volatile global oil markets, already rattled by disruptions and uncertainty. Finally, negotiators sought to confront Iran’s enduring nuclear ambitions, an issue that has long complicated relations with the West. Together, these objectives reflected both immediate crisis management and deeper structural concerns shaping the geopolitical landscape. The selection of Islamabad as the venue for United States, Iran talks reflected Pakistan’s diplomatic positioning, maintaining working relations with both U.S. and Iran. However, hosting such high-stakes negotiations carried inherent risks, given the deep mistrust between the two sides and limited prospects for a breakthrough. Pakistan’s motivations extended beyond facilitation. It sought to reassert its strategic relevance in Washington’s policy framework amid signs of declining importance. At the same time, Islamabad may have acted as a discreet intermediary, enabling back-channel communication and even transmitting key proposals when formal diplomatic routes stalled. There are reports indicating that Saudi Arabia and Qatar extended significant financial assistance to Pakistan at a critical juncture. This support, estimated at around $5 billion, was primarily aimed at stabilising Pakistan’s fragile economy and easing pressure on its foreign exchange reserves, particularly as Islamabad prepared to repay approximately $3.5 billion in debt to the United Arab Emirates. As this financial backing coincided with Pakistan’s role in hosting the U.S. Iran peace talks, there is no verified evidence to suggest that the funds were explicitly provided to finance or organise the negotiations. However, the timing has led Pakistan watchers to interpret the assistance within a broader strategic context—where economic support, diplomatic engagement, and regional stability efforts appear increasingly interconnected. Regional compulsions also shaped Pakistan’s role. Its security ties with Saudi Arabia and economic links with Iran placed it in a delicate balancing act, particularly amid rising tensions between Riyadh and Tehran. Hosting the talks allowed Pakistan to project itself as a responsible regional actor while managing competing interests. Operationally, Pakistan demonstrated diplomatic agility—facilitating logistics, security, and engagement with stakeholders such as China and Gulf states. While it succeeded in bringing adversaries to the table and sustaining limited de-escalation, it ultimately fell short of securing a lasting agreement, underscoring both its relevance and its limitations as a mediator. The United States delegation was led by Vice President JD Vance. Two key participants included Jared Kushner son in law of Trump and Steve Witkoff. The Iran delegation was headed by Speaker of Parliament Mohammad Bagher Ghalibaf, Foreign Minister Abbas Araghchi and other senior officials from diplomatic and economic sectors were also part of the delegation. The negotiations stretched over nearly twenty-one hours, unfolding across multiple rounds marked by formal sessions, back-channel contacts, and the exchange of draft proposals. The agenda was both expansive and contentious, reflecting the complexity of the crisis. Key issues included the contours of a possible ceasefire, the security and free flow of shipping through the strategically vital Strait of Hormuz, and the future of Iran’s nuclear programme. Economic dimensions, particularly sanctions and financial relief, were central to the discussions, as were regional flashpoints such as Lebanon, where tensions involving Iranian-backed actors continued to complicate the broader diplomatic picture. The United States approached the talks with a security-driven framework, anchored in a set of non-negotiable demands. Washington insisted that Iran abandon any pathway to nuclear weapons, significantly curtail uranium enrichment, and submit to rigorous international inspections under the International Atomic Energy Agency. It also pressed for guarantees of unimpeded navigation through the Strait of Hormuz, given its global economic significance. Additionally, the U.S. sought a rollback of Iran’s support to regional proxies, including groups such as Hezbollah. Overall, the American position reflected a willingness to consider calibrated concessions, but only within a framework that prioritised long-term security assurances. Iran, for its part, framed its position around sovereignty, economic relief, and regional recognition. Tehran demanded the lifting of U.S.-imposed sanctions and raised the issue of reparations for damage caused by military strikes. It also sought acknowledgment of its strategic role in the Strait of Hormuz and pushed for a ceasefire in Lebanon as part of a broader regional de-escalation. Crucially, Iran refused to relinquish its nuclear programme entirely, viewing it as both a sovereign right and a marker of technological advancement. While Washington sees a nuclear-capable Iran as a threat to Israel and Gulf states, Tehran regards it as a necessary deterrent. The Strait of Hormuz remains central to the crisis, carrying nearly a fifth of the world’s oil supplies and serving as a critical lifeline for major economies such as China, India and Europe. Control over this narrow waterway has thus become a strategic flashpoint. Iran has sought to assert a dominant role in the strait, framing it as integral to its regional influence, while the United States has insisted on unfettered navigation, arguing that any disruption constitutes a global, not merely bilateral, concern. Compounding tensions, Tehran has resisted demands to curb its ballistic missile arsenal and has shown little willingness to scale back its wider military footprint across the region. The collapse of the U.S. Iran negotiations was rooted in structural, strategic, and political constraints that made meaningful progress within a limited timeframe unrealistic. The talks attempted to address an overly ambitious agenda, ranging from Iran’s nuclear programme to regional conflicts, sanctions relief, and maritime security, within barely a day of negotiations. Such compressed diplomacy was insufficient to resolve disputes that have evolved over decades. A fundamental divide persisted: the United States demanded strict limits and monitoring, while Iran defended its nuclear programme as sovereign, causing deadlock. Deep-seated mutual distrust further undermined the process. Iran remains sceptical of U.S. commitments, citing past sanctions and withdrawals from agreements, while the U.S. views Iran’s regional posture and missile programme with concern. Both sides accused each other of inflexibility, with Iran dismissing U.S. demands as excessive and Washington arguing that Tehran refused key concessions. Complicating matters were broader regional dynamics, including tensions involving Israel, Lebanon, and the strategic Strait of Hormuz—through which roughly one-fifth of global oil supplies transit. The U.S. emphasises freedom of navigation, whereas Iran views the waterway as central to its strategic leverage. Ultimately, maximalist negotiating positions and domestic political pressures on both sides constrained compromise. Leadership in Washington sought a robust agreement, while Tehran remained wary of appearing to yield under external pressure, ensuring that diplomacy ended in stalemate rather than settlement. History suggests that such negotiations often stall repeatedly before progress is achieved, underscoring the enduring, if fragile, relevance of diplomatic engagement. The talks failed as neither side demonstrated the flexibility required to bridge core differences, particularly on security and sovereignty concerns. As a result, the negotiations ended abruptly, reinforcing scepticism about near-term breakthroughs. The broader diplomatic environment surrounding the talks was shaped significantly by regional and global powers, with China emerging as the most consequential external actor. China’s role has been both strategic and multidimensional. As a major energy importer, Beijing has a direct stake in stability in the Gulf, particularly the uninterrupted flow of oil through the Strait of Hormuz. At the same time, it has deepened its economic and strategic engagement with Iran, including long-term investment. Reports from the United States government suggest that China has been providing military support to Iran indirectly, while also cautioning Washington over maritime access in the Strait of Hormuz. China has also positioned itself as a counterweight to United States influence, advocating dialogue while cautioning against any disruption to maritime trade routes. Its growing diplomatic footprint in West Asia, demonstrated in past mediation efforts, underscores its ambition to shape regional outcomes. Overall, while multiple actors shaped the diplomatic context, China’s expanding economic leverage and strategic assertiveness have made it the pivotal external player in the evolving equation. Overall, China is navigating the crisis with a long-term perspective, aiming to preserve stability while reinforcing its role as a significant diplomatic and economic player and of the big brother of the region. Among West Asian countries, Saudi Arabia and key Gulf states have played a balancing role. While aligned with Washington on security concerns, they have increasingly supported de-escalation to avoid regional instability that could threaten energy markets and domestic security. Their quiet diplomatic engagement has helped sustain channels for dialogue. Russia’s approach to the ongoing U.S.–Iran conflict reflects a mix of caution, calculated support, and strategic opportunism. Moscow has steered clear of direct military involvement, instead extending limited intelligence and logistical backing that enables Iran to sustain its position without drawing Russia into a larger confrontation. On the diplomatic front, it has projected itself as a potential intermediary, advocating for a balanced and lasting resolution while working alongside partners such as China to challenge U.S. positions in global forums. The crisis has also brought economic advantages, with higher oil prices boosting Russian revenues amid uncertainty in the Strait of Hormuz. At the same time, Russia is leveraging the situation to strengthen its footprint in West Asia, maintaining a careful balance—supporting Iran where necessary while avoiding deeper entanglement and benefiting from the strategic distraction of the United States elsewhere. India’s approach to the ongoing U.S.– Iran conflict reflects a careful balance between restraint, diplomacy, and the protection of national interests. New Delhi has avoided taking sides, choosing instead to advocate for dialogue and de-escalation while maintaining neutrality. At the same time, it has remained actively engaged with both Washington and Tehran to secure critical priorities, particularly uninterrupted energy supplies and safe passage through the Strait of Hormuz, which is vital for India’s oil imports. By sustaining communication with Iran while deepening its strategic partnership with the United States, India continues to uphold its principle of strategic autonomy. Given its balanced relationships, India is increasingly seen as a potential bridge-builder, though it has so far opted for quiet, behind-the-scenes engagement. Overall, India is navigating a complex geopolitical landscape with a focus on stability, economic security, and diplomatic flexibility. Its role has been restrained but not insignificant. With strong ties to both Iran and Gulf states and a heavy dependence on regional energy supplies, New Delhi has consistently supported stability and freedom of navigation, while avoiding overt involvement in the negotiations. The two-week ceasefire in West Asia offers a momentary respite but does little to resolve the deeper structural tensions between the United States and Iran. The collapse of negotiations highlights the persistence of strategic mistrust, conflicting national priorities, and the limitations of compressed diplomacy in addressing long-standing disputes. As regional and global powers continue to shape the evolving dynamics—from China’s growing influence to the cautious balancing of Gulf states—the path ahead remains uncertain. While diplomacy is likely to return as the only viable long-term solution, any meaningful progress will depend on shifts in both political will and ground realities. Until then, the ceasefire stands as a fragile buffer in a region where the risks of escalation remain ever-present. The latest reports suggest that US–Iran negotiations are expected to resume soon as both sides signal willingness to continue diplomatic engagement despite recent setbacks. Officials indicate discussions could restart within days, possibly before the current ceasefire deadline expires. With a fragile truce in place, renewed negotiations are seen as critical to preventing further escalation and stabilising the region amid growing international pressure for a diplomatic resolution. Pakistan’s role drew mixed assessments, where some viewed it as gaining diplomatic visibility, critics argued that its perceived alignment with Washington limited its effectiveness as a mediator. (Jai Kumar Verma is a Delhi-based strategic analyst and Life Member of United Services Institute of India and member of The Manohar Parrikar Institute for Defence Studies and Analyses. The views in the article are solely the author’s. He can be contacted at editor.adu@gmail.com) https://www.aviation-defence-universe.com/geopolitical-ramifications-of-raisis-death-irans-political-future-in-question/ Geopolitical Ramifications of Raisi’s Death: Iran’s Political Future in Question • Iranian hardliners mourn Raisi • Moderates show indifference amid economic struggles By Jai Kumar Verma New Delhi. 04 June 2024. The sudden death of Iranian President Ebrahim Raisi in a helicopter crash on 19 May 2024 has profound geopolitical ramifications, impacting Iran’s domestic power structure and its international relations. Three strategic views of the situation point towards a domestic power struggle created by the vacuum in leadership which might result into reiteration and rising from the phoenix of Raisi’s death of hardliners, a possibility albeit slim, that a more moderate leader could emerge, potentially shifting Iran’s domestic and foreign policies which could ease internal unrest and improve relations with the West and his death could either stall the ongoing negotiations or, depending on his successor, create an opportunity for a more conciliatory approach, potentially leading to a breakthrough or further deadlock in talks. Speculation are strife. Iranian President Ebrahim Raisi, Foreign Minister Hossein Amir-Abdollahian, East Azerbaijan Governor Malek Rahmati and senior cleric Mohammad Ali Ale-Hashem along with few others died in a helicopter crash on 19 May 2024. The helicopter crashed at Mount Sahand near Jolfa which is situated at Iran Azerbaijan border. The crash occurred when they were returning from the inauguration of a newly built Qiz Qalasi dam which is situated on Iran Azerbaijan border. There was heavy fog in the forested area where accident occurred. The search and rescue mission also faced numerous difficulties. Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei announced five days public mourning and offered his condolences. Both Raisi and Mokhber were close to supreme leader. The death of the Iranian President and Foreign Minister shocked not only Iran but world too. Iranian government launched an enquiry of the helicopter crash. The terrain of the crash area was difficult and there was heavy fog. The other important point is that it was an old Bell 212 aircraft which was purchased by Iran before 1979 Islamic Revolution. These helicopters are deployed in VIP Transport Squadron of Iranian Air Force. It is a twin-engine helicopter and now it is phased out by most of the countries and these countries are using Bell 412 and Leonardo AW139 which are more modern and safe. After Iranian Revolution in 1979 the relations between U.S. and Iran deteriorated and U.S. put sanctions which hampered the maintenance and replacement of parts and equipment of aircraft. Iranian officials also claim that because of U.S. sanctions helicopter could not be maintained properly hence it crashed, thereby making U.S. indirectly responsible for the crash. The possibility of bad weather, fog, mountainous terrain, dense forest, low visibility and ill-maintenance of helicopter can be a cause of its crash. It may be possible that because of these adverse circumstances the pilot might have been forced to try hard landing and it may have caused the crash. The Iranian authorities took time in announcing the death of President, Foreign Minister and other people in the plane thereby adding fire to different type of rumours. Soon after the crash, the social media chatter became very active with different theories about the foul play in the helicopter crash. The crash generated conspiracy theories because of geopolitical dynamics of West Asia as well as due to domestic power struggle in Iran. President Raisi was front runner in the line to become the Supreme Leader, besides him there were other contenders also including Mojtaba Khamenei the son of Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei who is 85 years old. Hence few analysts claim that the Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei wanted to make his son Mojtaba Khamenei as supreme leader and for that removal of Raisi was necessary. These type of reasons are very common in West Asian region. After the death of Ebrahim Raisi the supreme leader appointed Vice President Mohammad Mokhber as interim president for 50 days. These 50 days are important as the president would be selected during this time. The timing of the helicopter crash is also significant as Iran became deeply involved with Russia and supported it diplomatically and militarily. It also voted against United Nations resolutions which were condemning Moscow. Iran also supplied drones, surface to surface ballistic missiles etc. to Russia. Iran was also supporting Hamas and other proxy terrorist outfits hence both C.I.A of U.S. and Mossad of Israel could also be involved in the crash of the helicopter, was another rumour. Hamas which is an Iran’s proxy attacked Israel on 7 October and at present Israel is attacking Hamas. Hamas also issued a statement extending condolences to the Iranian people on the tragic demise of Raisi. Talks were held between U.S. and Iran so that sanctions can be reduced, Israel wants that sanctions on Tehran should continue. Not only this other Iran-aligned groups are attacking or threatening Israel of dire consequences. A clandestine war is going on between Iran and Israel after exchange of drone and missile attacks. One theory is that Mossad which has capability to execute operations inside Iran, is behind the helicopter crash. Iran watchers claim that foreign policy is basically dealt by Supreme Leader and president and foreign minister have little say in it. Some experts claim that it should not be the handiwork of Israel as killing the president of the country is a direct act of war and Israel would not do it. Israel targets military and nuclear targets and not high-level political leaders. Another claim is that Raisi’s helicopter was shot out by a space laser. This theory is very popular in social media and on “X” nevertheless there is no proof about the use of space laser in the helicopter crash. Nonetheless, majority has agreed to the reason being natural crash because of dense fog and mountainous terrain. The helicopter was old, ill maintained because of U.S. sanctions and it may be a reason for the crash. The hardliners mourned the death of Raisi but large number of moderates showed no remorse on their death. Most of the shopkeepers have not closed their shops and work continued as usual. Few moderates also mentioned that they do not care about the death of Raisi as after his death another hardliner would takeover, and they would continue to suffer. They also claimed that Iran is passing from economic, social and political problems hence they do not care about his death. 63 years old Raisi was a hardliner and ordered that morality laws must be followed stringently, and he also ruthlessly crushed anti-government protests. Raisi was rigid while conducting nuclear negotiations with the world powers. He had full support from Supreme Leader Khamenei. The massive protests against religious hardline rule and death of a 22-year-old Kurdish woman Mahsa Amini in custody of morality police has undermined the popularity of Raisi. Iran is also confronting economic crisis because of sanctions put forward by U.S. and other countries. Brigadier Ali Abdollahi is head of the investigation team which would consist of technical, military and other personnel to investigate causes and circumstances of the helicopter crash in which Raisi and others were killed. Brigadier Ali Abdollahi did several important assignments but his ability to investigate air crash or his knowledge as aviation expert is untested. Abdollahi is anti U.S., a hardliner and has a poor human rights record. U.S. has put sanctions on him because of terrorism, human rights violations and for expansion of weapons of mass destruction. He delivered a speech in Moscow in 2022 in which he bitterly criticised USA. Raisi was considered as a successor of Khamenei and after his death a vacuum is created and hence the current presidential election is very crucial which would be held on 28 June 2024. Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC) has increased its presence at sensitive places so that the liberal group, which is anti Raisi as well as the present hardline regime, do not start a new agitation. Raisi killed so many persons that he was infamous as ‘Butcher of Tehran”. The masses of Iran were suffering because of corruption, inflation and unemployment under the presidentship of Raisi. In the current scenario the importance of Iran which is actively supporting Russia has considerably increased. The western countries have placed numerous restrictions on Iran and Russia. China is also apprehensive about the sanctions hence these countries are not only coming closer to each other but also working against the interests of U.S. and other western countries. The open animosity between Saudi Arabia and Iran is also reduced and both have promised to establish diplomatic relations with the help of China. On one hand it reduced importance of U.S. in the region while importance of China has increased. As Iran is a major oil producing country and the death of Iranian president would impact Iran’s oil production and exports hence the prices of oil in the world market may go up. India and Iran has signed agreement on Chabahar port which is a strategic initiative, and it would increase trade between India and Central Asian countries. The agreement was signed in 2003 but the progress was slow because of U.S. sanctions on Iran. U.S. has criticised signing of agreement and cautioned of potential sanctions; however, U.S. may ignore it due to changing world scenario. Development of Chabahar would further reduce the importance of Pakistan’s Gwadar port. Economic implications are also strong. Iran is a major oil producer, and political instability could affect its oil production and export capacities. The death of the president might cause short-term disruptions, leading to fluctuations in global oil prices. The leadership change could influence Iran’s economic policies, especially in relation to international sanctions. A more moderate administration might seek relief from sanctions through diplomatic means, potentially stabilizing the Iranian economy. In conclusion, the death of President Ebrahim Raisi is a critical event with far-reaching implications for Iran and the broader geopolitical landscape. The unfolding leadership dynamics and international reactions will be crucial in determining the future trajectory of Iran’s domestic policies and its role on the world stage. (Jai Kumar Verma is a Delhi-based strategic analyst and Life member of United Services Institute of India and member of Manohar Parrikar Institute for Defence Studies and Analyses. The views in the article are solely the author’s. He can be contacted at editor.adu@gmail.com)

US-Iran Ties Dive As Trump Levies Comprehensive Sanctions On Shia Iran

By Jai Kumar Verma

New Delhi. 27 September 2020. Relationship between  US and Iran which is at its lowest ebb, last week plummeted when US President Donald Trump re-imposed sanctions on Iran.

On 19 September 2020 US Secretary of State Mike Pompeo stated that “Today, the United States welcomes the return of virtually all previously terminated UN sanctions on the Islamic Republic of Iran, the world’s leading state sponsor of terror and anti-Semitism.” He also made it clear that sanctions would be effective from 0800 p.m. (Washington DC time) from 20 September 2020. The US government also explained that they “would impose” sanctions on the country which does not follow the sanctions. The statement further mentioned that “thanks to the snapback of UN sanctions, Iran is now obligated to suspend enrichment, reprocessing, and heavy-water-related activities. We will never let the world’s leading state sponsor of terror obtain the world’s most deadly weapon.” Pompeo also made it clear that the US domestic authorities would impose sanctions on the countries which do not implement the sanctions.

It appears that at present US is alone on imposing sanctions on Iran as US European allies are challenging the sanctions. The foreign ministers of France, German and the United Kingdom (E 3) issued a joint statement on 20 September that “France, Germany, and the United Kingdom note that the US ceased to be a participant to the JCPOA following their withdrawal from the deal on 8 May 2018. Consequently, the purported notification under paragraph 11 of UNSCR 2231 (2015), received from the United States of America and circulated to the UN Security Council Members, is incapable of having legal effect. It flows from this that any decisions and actions which would be taken based on this procedure or on its possible outcome would also be incapable of having any legal effect.” The Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPA) is a treaty formulated on 14 July 2015 at Vienna between Iran and the UN Security Council’s five permanent members + Germany (the P-5+1) and the European Union on the non-proliferation of Iranian nuclear programme.

Besides it countries like Russia and China are also opposing the unilateral decision of US. The Russian foreign ministry issued a statement that “”The illegitimate initiatives and actions of the United States by definition cannot have international legal consequences for other countries”. On 20 September, Hassan Rouhani President of Iran also stated during a televised cabinet meeting that as US is putting “maximum pressure” on Iran, US is facing “maximum isolation” as powerful nations have already rejected the sanctions imposed by US.

The 13 out of 15 United Nations Security Council (UNSC) members including US close allies also claim that the current move of US is null and void and only limited nations would reimpose the sanctions which were lifted in 2015. The arms embargo on Iran was imposed by UNSC in 2007 and it is scheduled to end on 18 October 2020. It was decided by several countries including Iran, United States, China, Russia, Britain, Germany, and France so that Iran can be prevented from developing nuclear weapons. President Trump claimed that it was a worst agreement and left it in 2018. However, Britain, France and Germany told to UNSC that relief from sanctions to Iran would remain even after 20 September.

The ‘snapback’ or quick return to UN sanctions would mean that Iran has to suspend all activities related to nuclear research, enrichment, reprocessing, import or development of nuclear weapon delivery system. The arms embargo would be re-enforced, and Iran would be prohibited from developing ballistic missiles. It is expected that President Trump would issue an executive order so that US can put sanction on any country which defies the UN arms ban on Iran. 

Several countries believe that Iran is developing nuclear weapons hence several restrictions were imposed on Iran. The sanctions on Iran was levied by US in November 1979 when extremist Iranian students captured US Embassy in Tehran and took several Americans as hostages. US issued an executive order and about $ 12 billion of Iran were seized. The sanctions were removed in January 1981 after Algiers Accords under which hostages were released.

The second sanctions on Iran were imposed in 1987 because of anti-US activities and its support for terrorism. The sanctions were extended till 1995. The third sanctions were inflicted in December 2006 when Iran refused to stop its uranium enrichment program. Iran claims that its nuclear programme is for peaceful purposes including electricity generation and medical purposes but the world especially US does not believe this and claims that Iran wants to develop nuclear warheads which will be dangerous for the world peace.  On 2 April 2015 the P5+1 and Iran reached on an provisional agreement under which most of the sanctions would be removed and in turn Iran will accept the restrictions for next ten years. Nevertheless, President Trump declared on 8 May 2018 that US would withdraw from the Iran nuclear deal.

US imposed fourth sanction on Iran in November 2018 to force Iran to stop its assistance to terrorist outfits and shelve the development of ballistic missiles. In 2019 US enhanced the sanctions as it was believed that Iran was behind the attack on Saudi Arabia’s oil fields. Iran was also put on the black list of Financial Action Task Force (FATF). The US again put a resolution in UNSC to extend arms embargo on Iran beyond 18 October 2020, but the resolution was overruled by UNSC. Again, on 25 August UNO impeded US efforts to re-enforce snapback sanctions on Iran. Hence on 20 September US unilaterally imposed sanctions on Iran.

These sanctions has adversely affected Iran’s $ 483 billion oil-dominated economy and the people of the country. The Iranian exports suffered and had an adverse impact on its nuclear programme as it became difficult to import specialised equipment and material required for the nuclear programme. Iranian foreign minister also accepted that the sanctions have untoward effect. China emerged as the biggest trading partner of Iran. Not only this the sanctions have adverse effect on Iran’s oil and energy sectors as Iran is not able to procure necessary equipment and several foreign oil companies withdrew from Iran. The Iranian Rial was considerably devalued after imposition of sanctions. Besides economic crisis there was also adverse political effect of the sanctions as public is suffering and resentment is growing against President Hassan Rouhani who became president on 3 August 2013. Although there is no sanction against pharmaceuticals and medical equipment, but the country is facing acute shortage of several drugs. The import of drugs from USA and other countries have considerably reduced. The smuggling of drugs is also increased. Large number of civil society activists, intellectuals, students, academics and human right activists joined a civil movement against these sanctions and mentioned that these sanctions are “unfair”, “illegal”, biased and prejudiced.

There is an old history of animosity between Iran and US and it also enhanced when Major General Qasem Soleimani was killed in a US air strike at Baghdad International Airport on 3 January 2020. The missile attack on Major General Soleimani was personally approved by President Trump.

However, at present imposing of sanctions by President Trump, when its own allies and other world powers are against it, surprised the analysts. It appears that President trump imposed the latest sanctions in view of the forthcoming elections. Firstly, it will please the Sunni voters in US as the hostility between Shia and Sunni has increased all over the world. Sunni voters are pleased because of re-imposing the sanctions on Iran. Secondly the Sunni countries like Saudi Arabia and UAE will also be delighted as Iran is there foremost enemy. Both these countries will purchase armaments from US, and it will generate employment and will give financial benefit to the US. The Jew lobby which is very strong in US will also be happy as Iran is the biggest enemy of Israel. US also signed an accord with Afghan Taliban but it appears there are several hurdles in the deal and President Trump may not get full political benefit hence he needed more support.

(Jai Kumar Verma is a Delhi-based strategic analyst and member of United Services Institute of India and Institute for Defence Studies and Analyses. The views in the article are solely the author’s. He can be contacted at editor.adu@gmail.com)

SOUTH ASIA MONITOR

A Perspective on, from and of interest to the region

Powered by SPS Society for Policy Studies

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APR 19
2019

Strategic Chabahar port is win-win for India, Iran and Afghanistan

The Chabahar agreement is beneficial to India, Iran and Afghanistan. It is of economic as well as of strategical importance. Tehran has declared Chabahar as a free-trade zone, which will enhance its economic and strategic importance in global trade, writes J K Verma for South Asia Monitor

By J K Verma APR 19, 2019

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China, the world’s second largest economy, thinks that India may soon  challenge its supremacy not only in Asia but also in the world arena. Hence it encircles India through a ‘string of pearls’, a term used for a network of Chinese military and commercial installations spread from China to Port Sudan in the Horn of Africa. Besides encircling India, China also assists and instigates Pakistan to carry out hostile activities against India.

In view of the Chinese-Pakistan axis, Indian policy planners in 2015 signed an agreement with Iran to develop Chabahar port. It is a trilateral contract between India, Iran and Afghanistan. China is also developing Gwadar Port in Pakistan which is just 400 km by road and 78 km by sea. Chabahar has two ports, namely Shahid Kalantari and Shahid Beheshti. Both ports have five berths each. Chabahar port is situated on the Gulf of Oman and at the mouth of the Strait of Hormuz, giving Iran direct access to Indian Ocean.

Chabahar Port is labelled the “Golden Gate” as it gives easy access to landlocked countries like Afghanistan, Turkmenistan and Uzbekistan to the ocean. Chabahar port will also enhance India’s access to Iran, now the main gateway to Russia, Europe and Central Asia. Chabahar is also an important intersection of shipping and oil trade routes.

The port is strategic for India as it will sidestep Pakistan, allowing India to supply goods directly to Afghanistan. India can send more humanitarian assistance as the Zaranj - Delaram road, constructed by India in 2009, can be linked with the garland highway which will give access to Herat, Kandahar, Kabul and Mazar-e-Sharif, four prominent cities of war-torn Afghanistan. Islamabad has, in the past, prevented India from sending goods to Afghanistan via Pakistan. Chabahar port will reduce Afghanistan’s dependence on Karachi port and will reduce Islamabad’s economic influence on Kabul. Western countries can also use Chabahar port to send supplies to Afghanistan and other landlocked Central Asian countries.

October 29, 2017 was a historic day as the first shipment from India to Afghanistan was sent via Chabahar port. Kabul exported its first shipment to India through Chabahar on February 24, 2019. Pakistan’s economy will be adversely affected because of direct trade between India and Afghanistan.

India can also counter Chinese influence in the Arabian Sea, which it seeks to increase through the Gwadar port. Chabahar port will reduce the cost of oil imports and will help India’s trade in iron ore, rice and sugar. The cost of importing uranium from Kazakhstan will also be reduced.

Chabahar is a principal city in Iran’s Sistan-Balochistan province. It is adjacent to Pakistan’s restive province of Balochistan. Although India, as a policy, does not assist secessionist outfits of other countries, it will remain a potential threat to Pakistan. In the late 1990s Iran, India and Russia assisted the Northern Alliance against the Pakistan-supported Taliban in Afghanistan.

India is constructing a railway line between Chabahar and Zahedan on the Iran-Afghanistan border. The railway link will further strengthen Indian trade relations with Iran and Afghanistan.

The Taliban have indicated that they have no problems with India and Iran and both countries can work in the economic progress of Afghanistan. Taliban also appreciates India’s consistent refusal to send troops to Afghanistan. However, if the Taliban comes to power, they are likely to choose Pakistan and China over India because of strategic reasons.

Pakistan, which always says India has no role to play in Afghanistan, will certainly push the Taliban to oust India from Afghanistan. President Donald Trump, because of internal pressures, wants to withdraw from Afghanistan at the earliest and peace talks between the USA and Taliban leaders are on in full swing. The possibility of the Taliban assuming power cannot be ruled out.

Western countries have placed stringent sanctions on Iran once USA pulled out of the multilateral Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action. But Washington, in view of the importance of Chabahar and India’s involvement there, has exempted Indian firms from sanctions. India is among the eight countries temporarily exempted from oil sanctions against Iran.

The Chabahar agreement is beneficial to India, Iran and Afghanistan. It is of economic as well as of strategical importance. Tehran has declared Chabahar as a free-trade zone, which will enhance its economic and strategic importance in global trade. Iran is among India’s largest oil suppliers.

Pakistan considers the joint project of India, Afghanistan and Iran as a security threat while independent analysts claim that it only indicates Pakistan’s isolation. Although Chabahar port is a win-win project for the three signatories, it is not directed against Pakistan or Gwadar port.  Both Gwadar and Chabahar ports could work together as Gwadar is a deep-sea port; hence larger vessels can go to Gwadar and goods can be transported from Gwadar to Chabahar.

(The author is a New Delhi-based strategic analyst. He can be contacted at jai_pushpa@hotmail.com)