China

https://www.aviation-defence-universe.com/india-russia-china-an-uneasy-triangle-of-power/ India, Russia, China: An Uneasy Triangle of Power • RIC Alliance in Flux: Can India Truly Trust China? • India weighs historic ties and rising tensions in a fragile RIC alliance with Russia and China By Jai Kumar Verma New Delhi. 26 August 2025. The RIC alliance—once envisioned as a strategic counterweight to Western dominance—is today at a crossroads, and India finds itself grappling with a pressing question: Can it truly trust China? As strategic fault lines deepen, what was meant to be a trilateral platform for cooperation has increasingly become an uneasy triangle of power. For New Delhi, the partnership is less about shared vision and more about managing contradictions, particularly in its fraught relationship with Beijing. The RIC framework now embodies both opportunity and risk, as headlines like “RIC in Turbulence: India’s Dilemma Over Trusting China” and “RIC at the Crossroads: Strategic Partner or Strategic Rival?” suggest. With China’s growing assertiveness and Russia’s evolving alignments, India is forced into a precarious balancing act—between cooperation and confrontation, between partnership and pretence. The central dilemma is clear: will RIC be a meaningful platform for multipolar stability, or will India’s uneasy equation with China render it an alliance in flux? Recently Russia has again called for the revival of the Russia-India-China (RIC) trilateral format, citing recent signs of de-escalation in border tensions between India and China. The RIC format has historically served as a platform for dialogue and cooperation among the three major powers, facilitating over 20 ministerial-level meetings over the years. These engagements have focused on fostering collaboration in areas such as foreign policy, economics, and regional security. However, the format has remained largely dormant since the 2020 Galwan Valley clashes between India and China, which severely strained bilateral relations and undermined trust within the grouping. Russia’s renewed push for engagement reflects its interest in restoring a balance in regional diplomacy and promoting multipolar cooperation in an increasingly polarized global environment. The Russia-India-China (RIC) alliance, conceptualized in the late 1990s, was envisioned as a strategic trilateral mechanism for fostering cooperation among three major Eurasian powers. With shared interests in multipolarity, regional stability, and reforming global institutions, the RIC platform was initially seen as a counterbalance to Western dominance. However, over the years, growing geopolitical shifts, border tensions, and diverging national interests, have complicated the alliance’s trajectory. Strategic Significance of RIC The RIC mechanism aims to promote a multipolar world order by balancing global power dynamics and reducing dependence on any single dominant power. It seeks to encourage economic cooperation and regional integration among Russia, India, and China, fostering mutual growth and stability. Additionally, RIC serves as a forum for dialogue on pressing global issues such as terrorism, climate change, and trade, providing a platform for collaborative approaches to shared challenges. Counterbalance Western-centric institutions like North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) and Group of Seven (G-7). NATO is a military alliance formed in 1949 to ensure collective defense among member countries. G-7 is a forum of seven major advanced economies: Canada, France, Germany, Italy, Japan, the United Kingdom, and the United States. They meet annually to discuss global economic policies, security, and climate challenges. in the North Atlantic region. Despite these commonalities, the trilateral grouping has always had asymmetries—economic, military, and strategic. China, with its rapidly growing influence, has emerged as the dominant player, while Russia plays the role of a strategic balancer. India, traditionally non-aligned but increasingly leaning towards the West, has found itself in a diplomatic tightrope walk. India is allied with the West for trade and strategic partnerships. However, the imposition of tariffs by the Trump administration strained economic ties, prompting India to explore closer cooperation with RIC to diversify its diplomatic and economic options. Challenges in the RIC Framework India-China Border Tensions The trust deficit between India and China is a fundamental challenge. The deadly Galwan Valley clash in 2020 marked the most serious military confrontation between the two since 1962 war, resulting in casualties on both sides. There was also a significant military standoff occurred in Doklam in 2017. This 73-day standoff took place at the tri-junction between India, China, and Bhutan, when Chinese troops attempted to build a road in territory claimed by Bhutan. India intervened in support of Bhutan, leading to a tense face-off, which was eventually resolved through diplomatic channels without escalation into open conflict. Despite multiple rounds of military and diplomatic talks, the Line of Actual Control (LAC) remains tense, with regular incursions and standoffs. This border instability undermines the spirit of cooperation and raises fundamental questions about China’s intentions towards India. Diverging Strategic Alignments India’s deepening partnerships with the United States, Japan, Australia (QUAD), and European nations have further complicated the RIC equation. Conversely, China’s increasing alignment with Pakistan and assertive behaviour in the Indo-Pacific is viewed by India as encirclement. The recent visit of the Philippines President to India highlights growing strategic cooperation between the two nations. With shared concerns over China’s aggressive behaviour—India in the Himalayas and the Philippines in the South China Sea—both countries are strengthening defense, trade, and maritime ties to ensure regional stability and uphold a rules-based order. China is apprehensive of India’s developing relations with Philippines. (The details about the recent visit of President of Philippines can be seen on https://www.aviation-defence-universe.com/from-friendship-to-strategic-partnership-india-and-philippines-mark-75-years-with-defence-and-economic-boost/). China’s strategic efforts to encircle India reflect its intent to limit India’s rise as a regional power. In 1980, India and China had comparable economies, but today China’s economy is nearly five times larger. Recognizing India’s potential for rapid growth, China aims to keep India under pressure—politically, militarily, and economically. One key tactic is supporting Pakistan, both diplomatically and militarily, which includes turning a blind eye to cross-border terrorism. By fuelling instability in the region, China seeks to divert India’s focus from development to security concerns, thereby slowing its strategic ascent. Russia, once India’s foremost defense partner, is now increasingly dependent on China economically and diplomatically, particularly following its invasion of Ukraine and subsequent Western sanctions. This has eroded Moscow’s ability to act as a neutral broker between Delhi and Beijing. Economic Competition and Regional Influence While economic ties between India and China remain significant (China is still among India’s top trading partners), India has taken steps to reduce economic dependence—banning several Chinese apps, tightening FDI regulations, and promoting self-reliance. Additionally, both countries vie for influence in South Asia, Africa, and multilateral bodies like BRICS, SCO, and the UN. These overlapping ambitions further strain the trust quotient. India and China, Asia’s two largest economies, are engaged in growing economic competition and a struggle for regional influence. China’s rapid industrial growth, massive infrastructure projects like the Belt and Road Initiative (BRI), and deep pockets have helped it expand its presence across Asia and beyond. In response, India is strengthening regional partnerships through initiatives like the Indo-Pacific strategy, Act East Policy, and increased engagement with ASEAN and QUAD nations. Both countries vie for influence in South Asia, Africa, and the Indian Ocean Region, with their economic models, political systems, and strategic interests often clashing. This competition shapes the future balance of power in Asia. Can India Trust China? India cannot afford to trust China unconditionally due to several ongoing concerns. First, China has repeatedly carried out border transgressions, undermining mutual trust and violating established protocols. Second, there is a clear pattern of strategic encirclement, exemplified by China’s Belt and Road Initiative projects in Pakistan-occupied Kashmir, which is violation of India’s sovereignty. Lastly, China often adopts an aggressive stance in multilateral forums, challenging India’s interests and regional influence. These factors collectively make unconditional trust in China a strategic risk for India. However, complete disengagement from China is neither practical nor beneficial for India, given the deep economic ties, geographic proximity, and the global roles both countries play. Cutting off relations entirely would disrupt trade, limit strategic options, and reduce India’s influence in regional and global forums. Therefore, the relationship must be carefully managed through a balanced approach that combines realism, deterrence, and diplomacy. Realism involves acknowledging the structural competition between the two nations and preparing accordingly, without harbouring illusions of sudden friendship. Deterrence requires maintaining a credible military posture, particularly along the Line of Actual Control (LAC), to prevent further incursions. At the same time, diplomacy remains essential to avoid escalation and keep communication channels open. To promote a more stable relationship, trust-building measures are crucial. These include greater transparency in military deployments, effective confidence-building mechanisms (CBMs) at the LAC to manage border tensions, and economic recalibration that reduces overdependence on Chinese imports while maintaining selective engagement in areas of mutual benefit. Such steps can help stabilize ties and prevent conflict, but expectations must remain realistic—these measures may ease tensions, but they won’t transform the relationship overnight. The process will be gradual, requiring consistent effort, strategic patience, and national consensus. Does the RIC Alliance Have a Future? Despite the challenges, the RIC framework is not entirely obsolete. It still provides a platform for dialogue, particularly during global crises, and serves as an opportunity to reduce bilateral tensions through multilateral diplomacy. Additionally, it offers a chance to collectively advocate for Global South priorities on international platforms. However, the alliance is no longer the primary vehicle for regional cooperation, as it has been increasingly overshadowed by more pragmatic and focused groupings such as BRICS+, the Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO), and Indo-Pacific frameworks. The future relevance of RIC will likely depend on its ability to adapt. This includes shifting from broad strategic alignment to issue-based coalitions in areas like climate change, health, and energy. It also requires a more realistic acknowledgment of the ongoing India-China rivalry, with efforts to compartmentalize cooperation where possible. Finally, RIC must place greater emphasis on multilateralism as a means of progress, rather than allowing bilateral frictions to stall collective action. In conclusion, the relevance of the RIC framework must be evaluated in light of evolving international dynamics and high-stakes geopolitical shifts. Recent events such as the Trump-Putin meeting signal a potential recalibration of U.S.-Russia relations, which could indirectly impact RIC cohesion, particularly if U.S. policies further alienate Russia from Western alliances. Simultaneously, President Putin’s high-profile visit to China and his meeting with President Xi Jinping underscore the strengthening of the Sino-Russian strategic partnership, potentially narrowing the space for India to balance its position within the trio. Meanwhile, the bilateral meeting between Prime Minister Modi and Xi reflects both the possibilities and persistent limitations of India-China engagement, especially given their unresolved border disputes and strategic mistrust. Adding to the complexity, the imposition of a steep 50% tariff on Indian exports by the Trump administration has deepened India’s economic concerns, as the U.S. remains its largest export market. Such international pressures highlight India’s strategic dilemma: balancing its economic reliance on the West with its regional engagement through groupings like RIC. Ultimately, the future of RIC will depend not only on how well it adapts internally but also on how its member states navigate an increasingly fragmented global order where bilateral ties, economic imperatives, and security concerns often outweigh traditional multilateral loyalties. Jai Kumar Verma is a Delhi-based strategic analyst and member of United Services Institute of India and The Manohar Parrikar Institute for Defence Studies and Analyses,. The views in the article are solely the author’s. He can be contacted at editor.adu@gmail.com) https://www.aviation-defence-universe.com/from-friendship-to-strategic-partnership-india-and-philippines-mark-75-years-with-defence-and-economic-boost/ From Friendship to Strategic Partnership: India and Philippines Mark 75 Years with Defence and Economic Boost • Indo–Philippine Ties Enter New Era Amid Rising Indo-Pacific Challenges • Maritime Allies in the Making: India and Philippines Deepen Security and Trade Links • BrahMos and Beyond: India–Philippines Strategic Partnership Gains Momentum By Jai Kumar Verma New Delhi. 12 August 2025. India and the Philippines share a diplomatic relationship that spans 75 years, rooted in shared democratic values, mutual respect for sovereignty, and a common vision for a free and open Indo-Pacific. While their early engagements were modest, largely confined to trade and multilateral cooperation within forums like the Non-Aligned Movement and ASEAN dialogue partnerships, recent years have witnessed a marked strategic convergence. Both nations face mounting security challenges posed by China—India along its Himalayan borders and the Philippines in the South China Sea—creating a natural alignment in their geopolitical priorities. This shared security challenge makes the partnership between the two countries not just symbolic, but strategically urgent. The state visit of Philippine President Ferdinand R. Marcos Jr. to India is his first since assuming office in 2022. The visit was timed to commemorate the 75th anniversary of diplomatic ties between the Philippines and India. Welcomed with full ceremonial honours at Rashtrapati Bhavan, President Marcos engaged in high-level talks with Indian President Droupadi Murmu and Prime Minister Narendra Modi, focusing on strengthening cooperation in defence, trade, maritime security, and people-to-people ties. Strengthening Strategic Alignment Against Chinese Assertiveness The elevation of ties to a Strategic Partnership signals a clear message that India and the Philippines are aligning more closely to uphold a free, open, and rules-based Indo-Pacific. The move is a direct counter to China’s expansionist policies. This positions both countries as part of a broader regional coalition resisting Beijing’s maritime and territorial ambitions. PM attends the Ceremonial Reception of the President of the Republic of Philippines, Mr. Ferdinand Romualdez Marcos Jr. at Rashtrapati Bhavan, in New Delhi on August 05, 2025. Formal diplomatic relations between India and the Philippines were established in 1949, making India one of the early Asian countries to engage Manila post-independence. In the Cold War years, both countries participated in global movements advocating for sovereignty and non-alignment, even as their strategic priorities differed due to geographic realities. Economic exchanges in the latter half of the 20th century were centred on pharmaceuticals, agricultural products, and machinery, while people-to-people links developed through cultural exchanges and academic cooperation. The relationship remained friendly but low-profile, with defence interactions minimal and mostly limited to multilateral settings such as ASEAN Regional Forum meetings. Defence and Maritime Cooperation as a Deterrent Joint naval drills in the South China Sea during the visit—the first-ever between the two nations—were highly symbolic and operationally meaningful. India’s experience in high-altitude warfare and the Philippines’ frontline role in maritime disputes complement each other. Defence agreements, including discussions on submarine infrastructure and the BrahMos missile deal, enhance the Philippines’ military capability, indirectly challenging China’s regional dominance. During his recent visit, the President of the Philippines expressed a strong interest in deepening defence cooperation with India, particularly in the area of missile technology. In an interview with an Indian journalist, the visiting President stated that the Philippines is keen to acquire more BrahMos supersonic cruise missiles, citing positive feedback from the country’s military personnel who have already been trained to operate the system. PM and the President of the Republic of Philippines, Mr. Ferdinand Romualdez Marcos Jr. witnessing the Exchange of MoUs between India and Philippines at Hyderabad House, in New Delhi on August 05, 2025. He emphasized that Filipino operators find the BrahMos missile system to be both effective and user-friendly, pointing to its ease of integration, reliable performance, and precision capabilities. These qualities, according to the President, make it a suitable choice for the country’s ongoing efforts to strengthen its defence posture, especially in light of regional maritime security challenges. The President’s remarks underline the Philippines’ satisfaction with its initial BrahMos acquisition, which marked a historic first in India’s defense exports. The continued interest signals a broader intention to build long-term strategic ties with India in defense and technology, while also enhancing the Philippines’ capability to defend its territorial integrity and maritime interests. Diversification of Alliances by the Philippines Historically reliant on the U.S. for defence, the Philippines is now diversifying its partnerships to include India and Japan. By doing so, it avoids overdependence on any single power and creates multiple strategic linkages to deter unilateral aggression in the Indo-Pacific. However, in the course of the interview with the Indian journalist the visiting President reaffirmed his country’s strategic alignment with the United States, particularly in the context of rising tensions in the South China Sea. He stated that the Philippines has full faith that the United States, under the leadership of President Donald Trump, would stand by its commitment to defend the Philippines in the event of any Chinese aggression. By citing this trust in the U.S. under Trump, the President sought to reassure both domestic and international audiences of Manila’s strategic calculations and preparedness amid growing regional uncertainties. He also acknowledged the importance of balancing traditional alliances like that with the U.S. while forging new defense partnerships with countries like India, as evidenced by the Philippines’ acquisition of BrahMos missile systems. India’s ‘Act East’ Policy in Action For India, the visit reaffirms its commitment to Southeast Asia under the Act East Policy. The Philippines is seen as a frontline state in resisting Chinese expansion in ASEAN waters, and deeper engagement with Manila helps India build a coalition of like-minded Indo-Pacific democracies. India is a country with no history of colonial involvement in Southeast Asia, and one with shared interests in maritime security and balancing China. The turn of the century saw a shift in priorities as India adopted its “Look East” policy, later expanded into the “Act East” policy, placing Southeast Asia—particularly the Philippines—firmly within its strategic horizon. Manila, traditionally reliant on the United States for security under the 1951 Mutual Defence Treaty, began seeking diversified partnerships to counterbalance China’s assertive maritime actions. The Philippines’ interest in India’s defence technology, especially the BrahMos supersonic cruise missile, became a game-changer. The first BrahMos deal in 2022 marked India’s most significant defence export at the time and served as a foundation for sustained security cooperation, including discussions on naval vessels, submarine infrastructure, and joint maritime exercises. Economic and Technological Resilience PM attends delegation level talks between India and Philippines at Hyderabad House, in New Delhi on August 05, 2025. Both countries are also looking to reduce their economic dependencies on China by boosting bilateral trade, tech collaboration, and infrastructure investments. The visit helped pave the way for enhanced cooperation in pharmaceuticals, fintech, and digital public infrastructure—all key areas for economic sovereignty. In 2024, bilateral trade between Philippines and China was approximately US $42.2 billion, with the Philippines importing about $32.8 billion worth of goods—making China the country’s largest import source—while exports to China stood at around $9.4 billion, meaning China accounted for over 25% of total imports but only about 13% of exports. In contrast, trade with India is much smaller yet growing. Bilateral trade hovered around US $3.3–3.5 billion, with Philippines importing medicines, auto parts, chemicals, and electronics, and exporting semiconductors, copper products, plastics, and animal feed. Evolving Security Strategy: Philippines is Looking Beyond U.S. For decades, the United States has been the primary security partner of the Philippines, rooted in their 1951 Mutual Defense Treaty. American military presence and diplomatic support have long served as a deterrent to external threats, particularly Chinese aggression in the South China Sea. However, recent global developments—and shifts in U.S. domestic politics—have led Manila to reassess the reliability of Washington as a sole security guarantor. During an interview visiting President mentioned that, due to its proximity to Taiwan—a mere 40-minute flight from northern Luzon—and the presence of around 160,000 Filipino workers in Taiwan, the Philippines could not remain neutral in the event of a war between China and the U.S. over the island. China issued a strong diplomatic rebuke on this statement. China’s Foreign Ministry accused the Philippines of “playing with fire,” asserting that statements framed around geography and overseas nationals do not justify interference in what it deems an internal affair—Taiwan. It reiterated the one China principle, criticized the Philippines for reneging on earlier commitments, and warned the remarks jeopardize regional stability and violate both international and ASEAN norms. Declining Trust in U.S. Commitment under President Trump One of the most striking factors behind this reassessment is the growing unpredictability of U.S. foreign policy, especially under the leadership of President Donald Trump. President Trump pursued a policy agenda under the banner of “Make America Great Again,” which focused on strengthening the U.S. economy, enhancing national security, and asserting American interests on the global stage. He often questions long-standing alliances and demanding that allies increase their own defence spending in exchange for continued U.S. support. Trump also showed a lukewarm commitment to defending allies in Asia, with inconsistent messaging on the South China Sea and weak condemnation of Chinese militarization. His unpredictable diplomacy, including sudden withdrawal (from Afghanistan), raised concerns globally about whether the U.S. would uphold treaty obligations in a real crisis. A Calculated, Multi-Vector Foreign Policy PM and the President of the Republic of Philippines, Mr. Ferdinand Romualdez Marcos Jr. witnessing the Exchange of MoUs between India and Philippines at Hyderabad House, in New Delhi on August 05, 2025. President Marcos Jr. is following multi-vector foreign policy which denotes a strategy in international relations where a country pursues balanced and diversified relationships with multiple global powers and regional actors, rather than aligning too closely with just one. Manila is not abandoning the U.S., but rather hedging his bets. The Philippines still maintains deep military ties with America, including joint exercises and access agreements like EDCA (The Enhanced Defense Cooperation Agreement). Manila has also quietly joined a growing minilateral grouping—often dubbed the “Squad”—comprising Australia, Japan, the United States, and the Philippines. This emerging strategic framework centers on joint naval patrols, military exercises, intelligence sharing, and defense coordination—all aimed at reinforcing a free and open Indo Pacific and countering China’s maritime assertiveness. This alliance resembles a “new Quad,” though distinct from the traditional Quad that includes India, Japan, Australia, and the U.S. These countries conduct regular joint naval drills sometimes within the Philippines’ exclusive economic zone. The U.S., Japan, and the Philippines also hold trilateral summits and maritime exercises to bolster regional security. Experts view the Squad as a way for Manila to “borrow strength” from its allies in countering regional threats—elevating its strategic profile beyond that of a junior partner. During President Marcos Jr.’s visit, defence cooperation took centre stage as the foundation of a newly elevated Strategic Partnership. India underscored its role as Manila’s key arms supplier—delivering BrahMos supersonic cruise missiles and offering advanced platforms, including submarines infrastructure, ship design, and potential co-development of weapons. India offered additional BrahMos systems, potentially for the Philippine Navy and Air Force, India has also proposed cooperation to help develop Philippine submarine maintenance and support facilities, particularly as the Philippines plans to acquire submarines for the first time. India also offered offshore patrol vessels (OPVs) and light frigates to bolster the Philippine Navy’s capabilities. President Marcos affirmed that “everything is on the table,” signalling openness to expanding defense procurement—ranging from missile systems to naval and air platforms—to boost the Philippines’ territorial resilience. PM attends the Ceremonial Reception of the President of the Republic of Philippines, Mr. Ferdinand Romualdez Marcos Jr. at Rashtrapati Bhavan, in New Delhi on August 05, 2025. President Marcos Jr.’s visit to India is more than ceremonial—it is a calculated geopolitical signal. As China continues to test the limits of regional order, India and the Philippines are responding not with isolation, but with strategic cooperation, signalling that the Indo-Pacific will not be shaped by unilateral force but by coordinated diplomacy and defence partnerships. India’s defence relationship with the Philippines is entering a new phase, led by the pioneering BrahMos deal and expanding into wider domains like naval, aerial, and surveillance systems. For the Philippines, this partnership offers cost-effective, regionally aligned, and strategically valuable capabilities. For India, it represents a significant step in building its stature as a reliable security partner in the Indo-Pacific one that offers not just weapons, but long-term cooperation and strategic trust. Complemented by emerging economic and technological collaboration, this partnership positions India and the Philippines as actors in maintaining regional stability, advancing maritime security, and promoting multipolar balance in Asia. The 2025 state visit by President Marcos Jr. to India reiterated the deepening of Indo–Philippine relations. Defence and maritime security dominated the agenda, with both nations committed to coordinated deterrence in the Indo-Pacific. Joint naval drills in the South China Sea, the offer of additional BrahMos systems, and cooperation in submarine maintenance signal a relationship moving from transactional arms sales to strategic trust. Economically, both countries are working to expand bilateral trade beyond the current US $3.5 billion level, focusing on pharmaceuticals, fintech, digital infrastructure, and semiconductors. As India cements its role as a reliable security and development partner in Southeast Asia, and the Philippines balances its traditional alliance with the U.S. with new partnerships, their evolving relationship is poised to shape regional geopolitics in the coming decades. (Jai Kumar Verma is a Delhi-based strategic analyst and member of United Services Institute of India and The Manohar Parrikar Institute for Defence Studies and Analyses. The views in the article are solely the author’s. He can be contacted at editor.adu@gmail.com) https://www.aviation-defence-universe.com/pak-china-bangladesh-tango-a-new-geopolitical-challenge-for-india/ Pak-China-Bangladesh Tango: A New Geopolitical Challenge for India? • China and Pakistan Tighten Grip on Bangladesh—Should India Be Concerned? • Is it the Rise of a New Regional Power Play? • Is it India’s Diplomatic Dilemma? By Jai Kumar Verma New Delhi. 13 March 2025. The evolving geopolitical dynamics in South Asia have raised concerns in India, particularly with the deepening ties between Bangladesh, China, and Pakistan. The recent developments, including Bangladesh’s interim leader Muhammad Yunus’ upcoming visit to China and growing military cooperation with Pakistan, suggest a strategic shift that could impact regional security. With Sheikh Hasina’s ousting, Bangladesh’s political landscape has undergone significant transformation, leading to increasing Chinese and Pakistani influence. Given India’s historical ties with Dhaka, the question arises: should New Delhi be worried about this emerging axis? Muhammad Yunus the Chief Advisor to the Interim Bangladesh Government has announced that he would be visiting China in last week of March. Yunus took over as head of the Bangladesh government on 07 August 2024, when Sheikh Hasina the elected Prime Minister of Bangladesh had to flee because of two days violent protests by students, radicals and opposition parties. In China Yunus would attend the Boao Forum for Asia (BFA) conference in Hainan province. The BFA had initially 25 Asian countries and Australia, however in 2006 the number was increased to 28 countries. It is a non-profit organisation which hosts high-level forums for leaders from government, business and academia in Asia and other continents to share their vision on the most pressing issues in this region and the world at large. Yunus announced his decision to visit China immediately after the 22-member delegation consisting of political leaders, journalists, academics, student leaders who led the agitation against Sheikh Hasina and civil society activists returned from China after a 10-day tour. As China is enhancing its influence in Bangladesh it is expected that Chinese President Xi Jinping would also meet Yunus during the visit. Yunus announced his Chinese visit two days after India raised the issue of the oppression of minorities including Hindus in Bangladesh in United Nations Human Rights Council session in Geneva. India also referred UN fact-finding report which mentioned that minorities faced “revenge violence” in Bangladesh. Delhi raised this issue as hundreds of Hindus were tortured, their homes and places of worship were plundered and destroyed after Sheikh Hasina was forced to leave the country. The 22 member Bangladeshi delegation was led by Abdul Moyeen Khan, a senior leader of the Bangladesh Nationalist Party (BNP) which is the main political party in the country after Awami League (AL). The delegation members met senior functionaries of Communist Party of China, government officials, journalists and others. China is taking advantage of rising diplomatic tensions between India and Bangladesh. The tension is growing on few issues including the extradition request of Sheikh Hasina by Bangladesh. Khan mentioned that it was a goodwill visit which was organised on the initiative of China. Yunus government requested Indian government to extradite Sheikh Hasina as she is facing charges against humanity, money laundering, murder etc. Sheikh Hasina denies these charges and India is not expected to extradite her. India and Bangladesh had cordial relations during the rule of Hasina as her detractors allege that she was pro-India. Sheikh Hasina got lukewarm treatment during her last visit to China. Xi Jinping met her only for 10 minutes and did not give the promised financial assistance to her. Government controlled newspapers also not gave required coverage to her visit. After the fall of Hasina, China heightened its interaction with leaders of Bangladesh political parties especially BNP and Islamic parties, journalists, activists, government officers including military senior officers. Bangladeshi Foreign policy advisor Touhid Hossain also visited Beijing in January and met Chinese Foreign Minister and others. As BNP is an important political party, China has invited BNP leaders last year as well as in 2025. The bilateral trade between both the countries is about $24 billion and Beijing is the biggest trading partner of Dacca. The Bangladesh military imports about 70% of its equipment and weaponry from China. The Chinese military supply includes VT-5 light tanks, MBT-2000 Type 90-II, F-7 BGI fighter interceptors, Ming-class diesel-electric attack submarines, Shadhinota-class C13B corvettes, and, HQ-7 short-range surface-to-air missiles. China also allowed Bangladesh to produce few Chinese small and light weapons. Dacca purchases Chinese weaponry as it is low-priced, it is easy to purchase and Bangladeshi officers have experience of using Chinese weapon systems. China has also funded and developed several infrastructure projects in Bangladesh. Besides internal disturbances Bangladesh is also projecting that it has external threat from Myanmar and relations with India are also not very friendly. Hence it is expected that Dacca would like to modernise its defence forces and its dependence on China would increase. On the other hand, India has limited interaction with Yunus government as few government advisers criticised India while BNP had a protest demonstration in December alleging that India is interfering in the internal affairs of the country by sheltering Hasina. India also reacted sharply and Indian Foreign Minister S. Jaishankar mentioned that Bangladesh has to decide “what kind of relationship they want with us.” Few analysts claim that if India would adopt a stringent attitude, the Yunus government would become more closer to Beijing and Islamabad. India is unhappy because of developing close relations between Bangladesh and China as Beijing tries to surround India especially in the Indian Ocean and pursues the policy of “String of Pearls.” China is developing bases in Hainan Island (China), Gwadar Port (Pakistan), Hambantota (Sri Lanka) and Sittwe (Myanmar). The defence cooperation between China and Bangladesh is cause of concern to India. In 2002 when Khalida Zia was Prime Minister of the country, China and Bangladesh had signed a Defence Cooperation Agreement. In 2009 Sheikh Hasina modernised defence forces with the help of Beijing. Delhi is concerned as the present interim government, the main political party BNP and Jamaat-e-Islami are anti-India. Besides these Pakistan’s Inter Service Intelligence (ISI) on its own as well as on behest of China is also enhancing its influence in Bangladesh. ISI is enhancing its network in Bangladesh with well-planned strategy of weakening India. ISI is getting patronage and support from Muhammad Yunus and it is penetrating in Bangladesh through maritime routes. The ships starting from Pakistan reaches Bangladesh with weapons and narcotics. ISI operations are funded through the smuggling of contraband drugs to India while weapons are given to Indian insurgent groups of North Eastern States of India through the porous borders of Bangladesh. ISI agents recruit and train Biharis as well as Rohingya Muslims residing in Bangladesh. These marginalised people are given weapons training and are radicalised against India and Hindus. ISI is developing a network of people so that cross border operations are conducted. ISI supplies arms and ammunition to the Arakan Rohingya Salvation Army (ARSA) through Hizb-ut-Tahrir and their trained agents. These ARSA workers attack Arakan Army in Myanmar while few of them are used for conducting terrorist activities in India. The ISI operators are also using social media for intimidating and threatening Hindu population in Bangladesh and blame them as Indian agents. In short run the social media propaganda demoralises minority community while in long run it would not only infuse fear but it would affect the cohesion between Muslims and minorities. Yunus met Pakistani Prime Minister Shahbaz Sharif in September & December where both expressed willingness to strengthen trade and other ties between both the countries. About a month back a four-member delegation of senior officers of ISI visited Dacca and met senior military and intelligence officers of Bangladesh. After this visit a six-member delegation of senior Bangladesh military officers visited Pakistan. ISI Chief Lt Gen Asim Malik also visited Dacca and there he was received by Lt Gen Muhammad Faizur Rahman, Quarter Master General (QMG) of the Bangladesh Army. Reports suggest that Lt. General Rehman is fundamentalist and he has close ties with Islamic radicals. A Bangladeshi warship also participated in a multinational naval exercise which was hosted by Islamabad. The unholy nexus developing between Bangladesh and Pakistan on the name of military cooperation and intelligence sharing is dangerous for India. The severity of the nexus enhances manifold as China which has close relations with Pakistan is strengthening its influence in Bangladesh after ousting of Sheikh Hasina. Bangladesh also wants to reduce its dependence on India hence it wants to increase its relations with Islamabad as well as Beijing. Although BNP which is an important political party of Bangladesh sent feelers that it wants to have cordial relations with India but in past when BNP was in power ISI was training and infiltrating terrorists to India through Bangladesh. The Indian security forces have intercepted suspicious wireless messages in Arabic, Urdu and Bengali. The possibility that ISI operators are sending coded messages to their agents cannot be ruled out. Recently ISI delegation also visited Rangpur in Bangladesh which is near the chicken neck corridor. India being a bigger player in the region should not be upset with rising influence of Pakistan and China on Bangladesh. India should try to inculcate cordial relations with interim government and should assure that Delhi is not averse if BNP comes to power. India should also try to assess the position of Awami League as well as of Sheikh Hasina and her son who is staying abroad. India should also try to convince USA, Europe and Britain that if influence of China enhances in Bangladesh it would be difficult for them all, hence they should also use their sway so that Dacca is saved from the undue influence of China and Pakistan. Besides these efforts India should also enhance its border security so that illegal infiltration can be stopped. India should also make sincere efforts so that anti-India sentiments are lessened. Yunus understands that President Trump would not help him as President Biden was helping. Internally also BNP, students, JEI all want early elections. Bangladesh Army Chief also clearly mentioned that army does not want to involve itself in internal duties hence the interim government should also hold early elections. The economic condition of the country is worsening which is also a great problem for the interim government. Hence Yunus wants to have cordial relations with India and desired to meet Prime Minister Modi in the sidelines of BIMSTEC Summit in Bangkok in April. In a recent interview to BBC Yunus mentioned about the historical ties between India and Bangladesh and stated that news about any tension between both the countries is a misinformation. India may adopt a policy of wait and watch as large majority of Bangladeshis feel that relations with Pakistan would be harmful for the country. Bangladesh is dependent on India for several things and would not spoil its relations with India because of Pakistan or China. The growing engagement between Bangladesh, China, and Pakistan presents a complex challenge for India. While Dhaka’s interim government seeks to diversify its strategic alliances, Beijing’s increasing influence and ISI’s activities in the region could have long-term security implications for New Delhi. India must balance diplomacy with vigilance—maintaining dialogue with Bangladesh while strengthening border security and monitoring geopolitical shifts. The upcoming BIMSTEC Summit could offer an opportunity for India to reassert its strategic position and ensure that Bangladesh does not drift entirely into Beijing and Islamabad’s sphere of influence. (Jai Kumar Verma is a Delhi-based strategic analyst and member of United Services Institute of India and The Manohar Parrikar Institute for Defence Studies and Analyses,. The views in the article are solely the author’s. He can be contacted at editor.adu@gmail.com) https://www.aviation-defence-universe.com/china-accords-diplomatic-recognition-to-taliban-government/ China accords diplomatic recognition to Taliban government Courtesy : Hong Kong Free Press • A slide from democratic norms • Endorses rule of terror By Jai Kumar Verma New Delhi. 14 December 2023. Hail the dictator and shun democracy, is the theory China has been following with all elan’. Came December and all eyes were once more on China and this time for reiterating it’s faith in the self-proclaimed dictum-militants justified rulers. In first week of December 2023 Beijing recognised the status of Ambassador to Taliban nominee Asadullah Bilal Karimi, thereby becoming the first country to bestow diplomatic status and officially acknowledged the authenticity of Taliban ruled government in Afghanistan. While addressing a press briefing on 5th December Wang Wenbin Chinese Foreign Ministry spokesperson said that “As a long-standing friendly neighbor of Afghanistan, China believes that Afghanistan should not be excluded from the international community”. Chinese Foreign Ministry spokesperson also mentioned that Afghanistan would “build an open and inclusive political structure, adopt moderate and prudent domestic and foreign policies, firmly combat all forms of terrorist forces, develop friendly relations with other countries, especially with its neighbors, and integrate itself into the world community”. China, Pakistan, and Russia continued maintaining their embassies in Kabul after American withdrawal and Taliban takeover. Though Beijing has not diplomatically recognised Taliban government but continued close cooperation with Kabul. The democratic world kept aloof from Taliban regime because of human right violations and atrocities on women. Taliban have banned the girls from studying after class sixth and most of the women were prohibited working in private or public places. Taliban have refused to give freedom to women and maintained that they are working according to Islamic laws. They also refused to accept that there are terrorist groups operating in Afghanistan. The United Nations refused to give Afghanistan’s seat in UNO to Taliban because of their ill-treatment of women and not adhering to international laws. In September Beijing sent its ambassador to Taliban ruled Kabul while other countries either kept the old ambassadors or appointed some one as head of mission as charge d’ affairs. In both these cases they do not have to present the credentials to the host government. About 20 countries continued their diplomatic missions operational in Afghanistan even after the takeover of Taliban in August 2021. United States and few other Western countries have shifted their diplomatic missions to Qatar while countries like India, Russia, and Turkey have allowed Taliban to takeover diplomatic missions of Afghanistan and run the same on charge d’affairs level. Beijing gave diplomatic recognition to Taliban government when Kabul and Islamabad have serious problems because of Tehrik-e-Taliban Pakistan (TTP), which is an alliance of few terrorist outfits constituted in 2007 to fight against Pakistan Army. TTP is also known as Pakistani Taliban and getting assistance from Taliban regime in Afghanistan. Pakistan blames Taliban government for providing safe haven to TTP and giving them assistance. The terror attacks on Pakistan security forces have considerably enhanced after Taliban came in power in Afghanistan. China and Afghanistan share borders and Beijing is worried as East Turkistan Islamic Movement (ETIM) which is a banned terrorist organisation took shelter in Afghanistan near China border and from there it creates trouble in Xinjiang province of China where Uighur Muslims are fighting for an independent nation. Beijing has been pressing Kabul to take stringent action against the terrorist outfits which assist terrorist organisations especially Muslim terrorist organisations in Xinjiang province. Afghanistan Ambassador Karimi assured China that “there is no threat to anyone from the territory of Afghanistan, and regional stability and security is in the interest of all.” Karimi who is in his early 30s was deputy spokesman of information ministry of Taliban government. The world is not recognising the present Taliban government in Afghanistan hence the country’s economic condition is deteriorating. Beijing is afraid that the country might plummet in turmoil again, and pro Uighur terrorist groups start assisting their counterparts in China. Beijing had also invited Taliban delegates to attend global Belt and Road Forum held in Beijing on October 17 & 18. It was the first opportunity to Taliban delegates to attend multilateral gathering after grabbing power. Post US withdrawal followed by the fall of President Ashraf Ghani’s government in 2021 and taking over of the governance by Taliban, it became essential for China and other neighbouring countries to deal with Taliban government though no neighbouring country except Pakistan wanted Taliban to come back to power in Afghanistan. However now Islamabad must also be repenting as the present Taliban government is assisting TTP. China is worried because of growing influence of several terrorist outfits especially Islamic State-Khorasan (IS-K) in Afghanistan. Beijing does not want that East Turkistan Islamic Movement (ETIM) should become strong in Afghanistan as it fuels secessionism and make terrorist attacks in Xinjiang Uyghur Autonomous Region in China where about 12 million Uyghur Muslims reside. After takeover of Taliban in Afghanistan, China’s main object in Afghanistan is to prevent spread of terrorism as Beijing knows that terrorism would soon spread in its Muslim areas. China has about 20 million Muslims which is about 1 to 1.5 percent of Chinese population. Russia, Pakistan, Tajikistan and even Iran are facing the same problem.China wants to secure itself through Collective Security Treaty Organization (CSTO). Russia established military base in Tajikistan is run by CSTO which provides security to Tajikistan government from terrorists entering from Afghanistan. China wants active assistance from Taliban in exterminating terrorist groups which help Uyghur Muslims as China is curbing their freedom movement with iron fist. Taliban government has already promised Beijing that it would not allow any assistance to Uyghur terrorist outfits from Afghanistan. Soon after Taliban came into power, they forcibly shifted Uyghur armed groups from Badakhshan Province which is near China border to Baghlan and Takhar provinces in central Afghanistan which is far off from Chinese borders. Taliban have not handed over any Uyghur terrorists to China because ideologically Uyghur terrorists are near Taliban and if Taliban would take any stringent action against them, they would lean towards IS-K. The possibility that few die hard Taliban support Uyghur terrorist outfits cannot be ruled out. Taliban would also like to use ETIM to pressurise Beijing in case of some trouble with China. China also wants to exploit the mineral rich Afghanistan but for that China also needs to ensure the security of Chinese working in Afghanistan. Beijing is worried as several Chinese were killed in Pakistan and does not want same to happen in Afghanistan. Afghanistan has more than 1400 mineral fields and have coal, oil, copper, gold, iron ore, natural gas, lithium, zinc, and several other important minerals. According to a rough estimate the minerals are worth $1 trillion. China wants to extract them and recently Beijing signed a deal worth $10 billion for access to lithium deposits. China also signed a $3 billion agreement to develop Afghanistan’s copper deposit. Kabul also signed seven contracts worth $6.5 billion for mining and processing of gold, iron ore, lead etc. China’s assistance comes with strings and its loan terms are always stringent and several countries were unable to repay the loan. It appears that Kabul which is facing several sanctions may fall into the Chinese debt trap. China has built a military base for Afghan Armed Forces in Wakhan District of Badakhshan Province of Afghanistan to strengthen counter-terrorism cooperation between both the countries. China also helped Afghanistan in establishing a mountain brigade in Badakhshan Province to fight terrorism. Afghan forces are also trained in China and Chinese soldiers patrol these areas. It is a case of -I scratch your back, you scratch mine- as China needs help from Taliban in controlling assistance to Uyghur terrorist outfits while Kabul needs Chinese assistance to develop their economy. However, China will sign agreements but will not make significant long-term investments in Afghanistan till Taliban hands over some senior ETIM leaders residing in Afghanistan. China will also assess the capability of Taliban of controlling all terror groups especially IS-K operating from Afghanistan. Presently Afghanistan is facing acute economic problems as USA and other Western countries have stopped financial assistance and also put sanctions. Kabul needs financial assistance from Beijing, while Beijing wants Kabul to control ETIM and other terrorist organisations assisting terrorist outfits operating in China. China also wants that Kabul should join BRI as well as China-Pakistan Economic Corridor. China also requires mineral resources of war-torn Afghanistan. However, there are several glitches between developing Afghanistan China relations. China’s financial assistance is always a debt-trap, and it becomes difficult to repay the loan. As Taliban conquered Kabul through terrorism, it would be difficult for them to justify long-term relations with China which is victimising millions of Muslims in the country. The security of Chinese personnel working in Afghanistan would always be in danger and there would be deadly attacks on them. These attacks would also create ill-will between both the countries. It is very difficult for Taliban government to control terrorism in Afghanistan hence China would not invest much in the country as it understands that investments are not safe in Afghanistan. At present the relations between Kabul and Islamabad are also tense hence Pakistan would never like cordial relations between Afghanistan and China. China has the culprit police and expects security within its borders. Great expectations indeed. (Jai Kumar Verma is a Delhi-based strategic analyst and member of United Services Institute of India and The Manohar Parrikar Institute for Defence Studies and Analyses. The views in the article are solely the author’s. He can be contacted at editor.adu@gmail.com)