RIC Alliance India, Russia, China

https://savioursmagazine.in/russias-push-for-the-revival-of-russia-india-china-ric-framework-india-cautious/ Russia’s Push for the Revival of Russia–India–China (RIC) Framework: India Cautious byJai Kumar Verma July 9, 2026 Share on FacebookShare on TwitterShare on LinkedInShare on WhatsApp While the world is engrossed and worried about the US and Israeli invasion of Iran and subsequent events impacting the global peace, trade and development, Russia seems to be pushing for the RIC Framework first propounded back in the nineties by the Russian Prime Minister, Primakov. In an exclusive article for the Saviours, we analyse the pros and cons of the RIC gambit. Introduction The Russia-India-China (RIC) framework dates back to the late 1990s, when former Russian Prime Minister and strategic thinker Yevgeny Primakov conceptualised it. Yevgeny Primakov served as Russia’s Foreign Minister from 1996 to 1998 and subsequently as Prime Minister from 1998 to 1999. He was the architect of the RIC strategic triangle, a core component of his foreign-policy doctrine, known as the Primakov Doctrine. Primakov was one of the strongest advocates of a multipolar world order, in which power would be shared among several major countries rather than dominated by a single superpower. During a visit to New Delhi in December 1998, he publicly proposed closer strategic cooperation among Russia, India and China. Primakov believed that such a partnership could help maintain global balance and provide an alternative centre of influence in international affairs. His idea later evolved into the Russia-India-China (RIC) framework and also helped shape the thinking behind larger groupings such as BRICS. The proposal reflected a broader shift in Russian foreign policy away from the strongly pro-Western approach of the early post-Cold War years. Instead, Moscow increasingly looked towards Asia and Eurasia, seeking a more independent role in world politics and stronger partnerships with major regional powers. At a time when the international system appeared increasingly dominated by the United States after the end of the Cold War, Primakov proposed closer cooperation among the three major Eurasian powers. His idea was to create a strategic triangle that could promote a more balanced and multipolar world order. The concept was not directed against any particular country but sought to strengthen dialogue and cooperation among Russia, India and China on global political, economic and security issues. Over the years, the RIC format provided a useful platform for consultations among the three nations. Also, it helped lay the foundation for broader groupings such as BRICS and the Shanghai Cooperation Organisation, where the three countries continue to engage on matters of mutual interest. The RIC framework has long functioned as an important platform for dialogue among three major Eurasian powers. Despite differences in their strategic interests, the mechanism facilitated consultations on regional and global issues and encouraged cooperation among emerging economies. However, the framework’s effectiveness declined significantly after the Galwan Valley clash in June 2020, which led to fatalities on both sides and triggered the most serious India–China border crisis in decades. The Galwan Hit The Galwan Valley clash severely undermined political trust between New Delhi and Beijing and created major obstacles to bilateral engagement. As border tensions continued, prospects for meaningful trilateral cooperation within the RIC framework diminished. Although Russia maintained strong relations with both countries, it became increasingly difficult to sustain the grouping’s momentum amid growing India–China tensions. As a result, RIC activities gradually became dormant, with limited high-level engagement. India has consistently maintained that lasting peace and stability along the Line of Actual Control (LAC) are essential for improving broader relations with China and revitalising cooperation in multilateral forums. In 2025, Russia renewed efforts to revive the RIC mechanism, arguing that closer coordination among the three countries could contribute to global stability amid increasing geopolitical uncertainty. China publicly welcomed the proposal and expressed its readiness to resume trilateral discussions. India has indicated that it remains open to multilateral engagement in principle; however, it has not committed to any specific roadmap for reviving the forum. Indian policymakers continue to maintain that progress in resolving border-related concerns and improving overall bilateral relations with China will play a decisive role in determining the future of RIC cooperation. As a result, the revival of the framework remains a subject of discussion rather than a confirmed diplomatic development. Russian Perspective From Russia’s perspective, the RIC framework carries significance beyond routine diplomatic consultations. Moscow views India and China as two of Asia’s most influential rising powers and believes that cooperation among the three countries is crucial for strengthening Eurasia as an independent centre of global influence. The platform is also regarded as an important instrument for amplifying the Global South’s voice and promoting a more balanced international order that reflects the interests of emerging economies rather than being dominated by Western powers. Russia’s interest in reviving the grouping has taken on greater urgency since the outbreak of the conflict in Ukraine. Western sanctions and political isolation efforts have encouraged Moscow to deepen its economic and diplomatic engagement with Asia. In this context, RIC offers Russia an opportunity to demonstrate its continued relevance in international affairs and to maintain strategic partnerships with two of the world’s major powers. Furthermore, Russia seeks to leverage its longstanding relationships with both India and China to facilitate dialogue and reduce tensions between them. By positioning itself as a bridge between New Delhi and Beijing, Moscow aims to preserve regional stability, maintain its influence in Asia, and promote greater cooperation across Eurasia. China’s Interests China’s support for reviving the RIC grouping is largely driven by its concerns about India’s growing participation in U.S.-led strategic arrangements, such as the Quad and the broader Indo-Pacific framework. Beijing has often viewed these initiatives with suspicion, believing that they are aimed at limiting China’s influence. From China’s perspective, a stronger RIC mechanism could encourage India to place greater emphasis on continental Eurasian cooperation rather than on maritime partnerships involving the United States and its allies. Chinese and Russian commentators have frequently criticised the Indo-Pacific concept, describing it as a source of bloc politics and geopolitical competition. At the same time, China presents RIC as a platform to improve regional stability. Beijing argues that Asia’s major powers should resolve their differences through dialogue rather than confrontation. Regular interaction among Russia, India and China, it believes, can reduce tensions, build confidence and contribute to a more stable regional environment. Another important reason for China’s interest in RIC is its broader objective of strengthening non-Western institutions and promoting a more balanced international order. Beijing views the grouping as a useful complement to existing organisations such as BRICS and the Shanghai Cooperation Organisation. While these forums already provide opportunities for cooperation, China believes that RIC can serve as an additional channel for policy coordination among three of Eurasia’s most influential countries. The platform could facilitate discussions on a wide range of issues, including trade, technology, climate change and reforms of global governance institutions. China has consistently argued that developing countries and emerging economies should have a greater voice in international decision-making. Through closer coordination within RIC, Beijing hopes to advance common positions on important global issues and strengthen cooperation among major non-Western powers. In this way, the grouping supports China’s long-term vision of a more representative and multipolar world order. China has a strong economic incentive to maintain stable relations with India, given the scale of bilateral trade. In FY 2024–25, India- China trade reached approximately US$127.7 billion, making China one of India’s largest trading partners. However, the relationship remains heavily imbalanced: India’s imports from China stood at about US$113.45 billion, while its exports were only US$14.25 billion, resulting in a trade deficit of roughly US$99.2 billion in China’s favour. This significant economic interdependence provides Beijing with a strong incentive to seek stable, predictable ties with New Delhi despite broader geopolitical differences. India is Cautious The principal reason for India’s hesitation to fully embrace the RIC framework is the deep trust deficit with China, which has widened manifold after the 2020 Galwan Valley clash. The incident, which resulted in the first fatalities along the India–China border in over four decades, fundamentally altered Indian perceptions of China and severely damaged political confidence between the two countries. Although subsequent diplomatic and military negotiations have led to disengagement in certain sectors of the Line of Actual Control (LAC), several underlying issues remain unresolved, preventing a complete normalisation of bilateral relations. Consequently, Indian policymakers have consistently maintained that normal relations cannot coexist with abnormal border conditions. This position reflects the belief that meaningful cooperation in broader political and strategic forums becomes difficult when core security concerns remain unsettled. Against this backdrop, deeper engagement within the RIC framework presents significant political and diplomatic challenges for India. Until lasting stability and mutual trust are restored along the border, New Delhi is likely to remain cautious about advancing trilateral cooperation with China through mechanisms such as RIC. India’s hesitation toward the RIC framework is also shaped by China’s expanding strategic partnership with Pakistan, which New Delhi views as a direct security concern. China has become Pakistan’s largest source of external financing, providing tens of billions of dollars in investments and loans under the China–Pakistan Economic Corridor (CPEC), a flagship component of the Belt and Road Initiative. Beyond economic assistance, Beijing has emerged as Pakistan’s principal defence supplier, providing fighter aircraft such as the JF-17 Thunder, naval vessels, air-defence systems, armed drones, and missile-related technology. India argues that this extensive military cooperation significantly enhances Pakistan’s conventional and strategic capabilities. Additionally, the passage of CPEC through Indian territories in Jammu and Kashmir is viewed in New Delhi as a challenge to Indian sovereignty. These developments reinforce Indian concerns that China’s regional policies are not strategically neutral but are increasingly aligned with Pakistan’s interests. The issue becomes even more sensitive because Pakistan-based terrorist organisations such as Lashkar-e-Taiba and Jaish-e-Mohammed are involved in terrorist attacks in India, including the 2008 Mumbai attacks and the 2019 Pulwama attack. Consequently, India remains sceptical about whether a stable and genuinely cooperative RIC arrangement is feasible, even as China continues its close strategic partnership with Pakistan. Altered Symmetry Another factor contributing to India’s caution is the growing power asymmetry within the RIC framework. When Primakov first proposed the idea in the late 1990s, Russia, India, and China were expected to function as relatively independent poles in a multipolar world. Today, however, China’s economic and technological capabilities far exceed those of the other two members. At the same time, Russia’s growing dependence on China—particularly after Western sanctions and geopolitical isolation—has altered the internal balance of the grouping. As a result, many Indian strategists fear that RIC could increasingly operate as a China-dominated platform, with Russia aligning more closely with Beijing’s preferences. This raises concerns that the original vision of an equitable and balanced strategic triangle no longer corresponds to contemporary geopolitical realities. Strategic Autonomy India’s contemporary foreign policy is anchored in the principle of strategic autonomy, which emphasises maintaining productive relations with multiple major powers rather than aligning exclusively with any one bloc. This approach, often described as “multi-alignment,” enables India to simultaneously deepen partnerships with Russia, the United States, Europe, Japan, ASEAN countries, and key Middle Eastern states while preserving its independent decision-making capacity. Such flexibility has become increasingly important in a fragmented international environment marked by great-power competition. Consequently, New Delhi is cautious about initiatives that could create the perception of India joining an anti-Western or anti-U.S. coalition. Although RIC is formally presented as a platform for multipolar cooperation rather than bloc politics, its revival amid growing tensions between Russia, China, and the West could generate adverse strategic perceptions. India, therefore, remains careful to ensure that participation in RIC does not constrain its broader diplomatic and economic partnerships. India’s approach to the RIC framework is also influenced by its growing engagement with the Quad, comprising India, the United States, Japan and Australia. While India views the Quad as a flexible platform for cooperation in areas such as maritime security, technology, supply chains and disaster relief, China and Russia often regard it as a mechanism aimed at containing China. This difference in perception presents a diplomatic challenge for New Delhi. Greater participation in both the Quad and a revived RIC framework could create competing expectations, requiring India to carefully balance its strategic partnerships while preserving its policy of strategic autonomy. The differing geopolitical visions of Russia and India also influence India’s cautious approach to reviving the RIC framework. Russia has increasingly emphasised the concept of “Greater Eurasia,” which prioritises continental integration, overland connectivity, and the development of institutions that can reduce Western influence across the Eurasian landmass. India, by contrast, places significant importance on a free, open, inclusive, and rules-based Indo-Pacific, with a strong focus on maritime security, freedom of navigation, resilient supply chains, and diversified strategic partnerships. While the two visions are not entirely incompatible and share certain areas of cooperation, their primary strategic priorities differ considerably. As a result, India must carefully balance its Indo-Pacific commitments with its Eurasian initiatives, contributing to a measured, cautious stance toward deeper engagement within the RIC framework. Economic considerations also influence India’s reservations regarding deeper engagement within the RIC framework. Despite substantial bilateral trade, India continues to face a significant trade deficit with China, alongside concerns relating to limited market access for Indian firms and excessive dependence on Chinese technology and supply chains. Consequently, New Delhi may be hesitant to expand political and strategic cooperation without meaningful progress in addressing these longstanding economic imbalances and commercial grievances. India is also mindful of the strategic signals that greater enthusiasm for RIC could send to its international partners. Given its expanding ties with the United States, Europe, Japan, and other Indo-Pacific partners, a visible shift toward RIC could be interpreted as India moving closer to a Russia–China axis. Such perceptions could create uncertainty regarding India’s commitment to the Indo-Pacific framework and broader strategic partnerships. As a result, New Delhi carefully calibrates its diplomacy to avoid unintended geopolitical messaging and preserve confidence among all major partners while maintaining its policy of strategic autonomy. India Reserves the Right Despite its reservations, India has not ruled out reviving the RIC framework. Official statements from the Ministry of External Affairs have consistently left the door open to engagement in a “mutually convenient manner,” reflecting New Delhi’s preference for diplomatic flexibility rather than outright opposition. This approach is closely linked to India’s commitment to strategic autonomy and its longstanding practice of maintaining relationships across competing geopolitical groupings. Furthermore, Russia continues to occupy an important place in India’s foreign policy as a key partner in defence cooperation, energy security, and connectivity initiatives across Eurasia. At the same time, India recognises that sustained dialogue with China remains necessary even amid unresolved disputes, particularly to prevent misunderstandings and manage tensions along the border. Consequently, New Delhi views RIC not as a preferred strategic platform at present, but as a potentially useful diplomatic mechanism that should be preserved rather than abandoned entirely. Future of RIC Looking ahead, the future of the RIC framework is likely to fall somewhere between limited engagement and selective functional cooperation rather than a full strategic revival. The most plausible scenario is a limited revival, with occasional meetings among foreign ministers and coordination on issues such as global governance, development, and multilateral reform, without significant strategic convergence. A more substantive form of cooperation could emerge in specific areas, including climate change, BRICS coordination, Global South initiatives, United Nations reform, and counterterrorism. However, a comprehensive strategic revival remains the least likely outcome. Such a development would require sustained improvement in India–China relations, a durable reduction in border tensions, and greater confidence regarding China’s relationship with Pakistan. Since these conditions are currently absent, RIC is more likely to function as a pragmatic diplomatic forum than as a cohesive geopolitical partnership. Conclusion India’s hesitation to revive the Russia–India–China (RIC) framework should not be interpreted as a rejection of multipolarity, strategic dialogue, or cooperative regionalism. Rather, it reflects a careful and pragmatic assessment of the contemporary geopolitical environment. The deterioration of trust following the Galwan Valley clash, China’s deep strategic partnership with Pakistan, persistent economic asymmetries, and concerns regarding an increasingly China-centric regional order have significantly altered the context in which RIC was originally conceived. At the same time, India’s expanding engagement with the Indo-Pacific, the Quad, Europe, the United States, Japan, and other strategic partners has increased the complexity of its foreign policy choices. While Russia continues to view RIC as an important pillar of a multipolar international system and China regards it as a mechanism for reducing strategic polarisation, India remains unwilling to pursue trilateral cooperation at the expense of its security interests, territorial concerns, or strategic autonomy. Consequently, New Delhi is likely to continue adopting a calibrated approach—remaining open to dialogue while avoiding commitments that could constrain its broader diplomatic objectives. The future of RIC will therefore depend largely on the trajectory of India–China relations and the extent to which existing sources of mistrust can be meaningfully addressed. Until such conditions emerge, any revival of the framework is likely to remain gradual, limited, and issue-specific rather than transformational. https://www.aviation-defence-universe.com/india-russia-china-an-uneasy-triangle-of-power/ India, Russia, China: An Uneasy Triangle of Power • RIC Alliance in Flux: Can India Truly Trust China? • India weighs historic ties and rising tensions in a fragile RIC alliance with Russia and China By Jai Kumar Verma New Delhi. 26 August 2025. The RIC alliance—once envisioned as a strategic counterweight to Western dominance—is today at a crossroads, and India finds itself grappling with a pressing question: Can it truly trust China? As strategic fault lines deepen, what was meant to be a trilateral platform for cooperation has increasingly become an uneasy triangle of power. For New Delhi, the partnership is less about shared vision and more about managing contradictions, particularly in its fraught relationship with Beijing. The RIC framework now embodies both opportunity and risk, as headlines like “RIC in Turbulence: India’s Dilemma Over Trusting China” and “RIC at the Crossroads: Strategic Partner or Strategic Rival?” suggest. With China’s growing assertiveness and Russia’s evolving alignments, India is forced into a precarious balancing act—between cooperation and confrontation, between partnership and pretence. The central dilemma is clear: will RIC be a meaningful platform for multipolar stability, or will India’s uneasy equation with China render it an alliance in flux? Recently Russia has again called for the revival of the Russia-India-China (RIC) trilateral format, citing recent signs of de-escalation in border tensions between India and China. The RIC format has historically served as a platform for dialogue and cooperation among the three major powers, facilitating over 20 ministerial-level meetings over the years. These engagements have focused on fostering collaboration in areas such as foreign policy, economics, and regional security. However, the format has remained largely dormant since the 2020 Galwan Valley clashes between India and China, which severely strained bilateral relations and undermined trust within the grouping. Russia’s renewed push for engagement reflects its interest in restoring a balance in regional diplomacy and promoting multipolar cooperation in an increasingly polarized global environment. The Russia-India-China (RIC) alliance, conceptualized in the late 1990s, was envisioned as a strategic trilateral mechanism for fostering cooperation among three major Eurasian powers. With shared interests in multipolarity, regional stability, and reforming global institutions, the RIC platform was initially seen as a counterbalance to Western dominance. However, over the years, growing geopolitical shifts, border tensions, and diverging national interests, have complicated the alliance’s trajectory. Strategic Significance of RIC The RIC mechanism aims to promote a multipolar world order by balancing global power dynamics and reducing dependence on any single dominant power. It seeks to encourage economic cooperation and regional integration among Russia, India, and China, fostering mutual growth and stability. Additionally, RIC serves as a forum for dialogue on pressing global issues such as terrorism, climate change, and trade, providing a platform for collaborative approaches to shared challenges. Counterbalance Western-centric institutions like North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) and Group of Seven (G-7). NATO is a military alliance formed in 1949 to ensure collective defense among member countries. G-7 is a forum of seven major advanced economies: Canada, France, Germany, Italy, Japan, the United Kingdom, and the United States. They meet annually to discuss global economic policies, security, and climate challenges. in the North Atlantic region. Despite these commonalities, the trilateral grouping has always had asymmetries—economic, military, and strategic. China, with its rapidly growing influence, has emerged as the dominant player, while Russia plays the role of a strategic balancer. India, traditionally non-aligned but increasingly leaning towards the West, has found itself in a diplomatic tightrope walk. India is allied with the West for trade and strategic partnerships. However, the imposition of tariffs by the Trump administration strained economic ties, prompting India to explore closer cooperation with RIC to diversify its diplomatic and economic options. Challenges in the RIC Framework India-China Border Tensions The trust deficit between India and China is a fundamental challenge. The deadly Galwan Valley clash in 2020 marked the most serious military confrontation between the two since 1962 war, resulting in casualties on both sides. There was also a significant military standoff occurred in Doklam in 2017. This 73-day standoff took place at the tri-junction between India, China, and Bhutan, when Chinese troops attempted to build a road in territory claimed by Bhutan. India intervened in support of Bhutan, leading to a tense face-off, which was eventually resolved through diplomatic channels without escalation into open conflict. Despite multiple rounds of military and diplomatic talks, the Line of Actual Control (LAC) remains tense, with regular incursions and standoffs. This border instability undermines the spirit of cooperation and raises fundamental questions about China’s intentions towards India. Diverging Strategic Alignments India’s deepening partnerships with the United States, Japan, Australia (QUAD), and European nations have further complicated the RIC equation. Conversely, China’s increasing alignment with Pakistan and assertive behaviour in the Indo-Pacific is viewed by India as encirclement. The recent visit of the Philippines President to India highlights growing strategic cooperation between the two nations. With shared concerns over China’s aggressive behaviour—India in the Himalayas and the Philippines in the South China Sea—both countries are strengthening defense, trade, and maritime ties to ensure regional stability and uphold a rules-based order. China is apprehensive of India’s developing relations with Philippines. (The details about the recent visit of President of Philippines can be seen on https://www.aviation-defence-universe.com/from-friendship-to-strategic-partnership-india-and-philippines-mark-75-years-with-defence-and-economic-boost/). China’s strategic efforts to encircle India reflect its intent to limit India’s rise as a regional power. In 1980, India and China had comparable economies, but today China’s economy is nearly five times larger. Recognizing India’s potential for rapid growth, China aims to keep India under pressure—politically, militarily, and economically. One key tactic is supporting Pakistan, both diplomatically and militarily, which includes turning a blind eye to cross-border terrorism. By fuelling instability in the region, China seeks to divert India’s focus from development to security concerns, thereby slowing its strategic ascent. Russia, once India’s foremost defense partner, is now increasingly dependent on China economically and diplomatically, particularly following its invasion of Ukraine and subsequent Western sanctions. This has eroded Moscow’s ability to act as a neutral broker between Delhi and Beijing. Economic Competition and Regional Influence While economic ties between India and China remain significant (China is still among India’s top trading partners), India has taken steps to reduce economic dependence—banning several Chinese apps, tightening FDI regulations, and promoting self-reliance. Additionally, both countries vie for influence in South Asia, Africa, and multilateral bodies like BRICS, SCO, and the UN. These overlapping ambitions further strain the trust quotient. India and China, Asia’s two largest economies, are engaged in growing economic competition and a struggle for regional influence. China’s rapid industrial growth, massive infrastructure projects like the Belt and Road Initiative (BRI), and deep pockets have helped it expand its presence across Asia and beyond. In response, India is strengthening regional partnerships through initiatives like the Indo-Pacific strategy, Act East Policy, and increased engagement with ASEAN and QUAD nations. Both countries vie for influence in South Asia, Africa, and the Indian Ocean Region, with their economic models, political systems, and strategic interests often clashing. This competition shapes the future balance of power in Asia. Can India Trust China? India cannot afford to trust China unconditionally due to several ongoing concerns. First, China has repeatedly carried out border transgressions, undermining mutual trust and violating established protocols. Second, there is a clear pattern of strategic encirclement, exemplified by China’s Belt and Road Initiative projects in Pakistan-occupied Kashmir, which is violation of India’s sovereignty. Lastly, China often adopts an aggressive stance in multilateral forums, challenging India’s interests and regional influence. These factors collectively make unconditional trust in China a strategic risk for India. However, complete disengagement from China is neither practical nor beneficial for India, given the deep economic ties, geographic proximity, and the global roles both countries play. Cutting off relations entirely would disrupt trade, limit strategic options, and reduce India’s influence in regional and global forums. Therefore, the relationship must be carefully managed through a balanced approach that combines realism, deterrence, and diplomacy. Realism involves acknowledging the structural competition between the two nations and preparing accordingly, without harbouring illusions of sudden friendship. Deterrence requires maintaining a credible military posture, particularly along the Line of Actual Control (LAC), to prevent further incursions. At the same time, diplomacy remains essential to avoid escalation and keep communication channels open. To promote a more stable relationship, trust-building measures are crucial. These include greater transparency in military deployments, effective confidence-building mechanisms (CBMs) at the LAC to manage border tensions, and economic recalibration that reduces overdependence on Chinese imports while maintaining selective engagement in areas of mutual benefit. Such steps can help stabilize ties and prevent conflict, but expectations must remain realistic—these measures may ease tensions, but they won’t transform the relationship overnight. The process will be gradual, requiring consistent effort, strategic patience, and national consensus. Does the RIC Alliance Have a Future? Despite the challenges, the RIC framework is not entirely obsolete. It still provides a platform for dialogue, particularly during global crises, and serves as an opportunity to reduce bilateral tensions through multilateral diplomacy. Additionally, it offers a chance to collectively advocate for Global South priorities on international platforms. However, the alliance is no longer the primary vehicle for regional cooperation, as it has been increasingly overshadowed by more pragmatic and focused groupings such as BRICS+, the Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO), and Indo-Pacific frameworks. The future relevance of RIC will likely depend on its ability to adapt. This includes shifting from broad strategic alignment to issue-based coalitions in areas like climate change, health, and energy. It also requires a more realistic acknowledgment of the ongoing India-China rivalry, with efforts to compartmentalize cooperation where possible. Finally, RIC must place greater emphasis on multilateralism as a means of progress, rather than allowing bilateral frictions to stall collective action. In conclusion, the relevance of the RIC framework must be evaluated in light of evolving international dynamics and high-stakes geopolitical shifts. Recent events such as the Trump-Putin meeting signal a potential recalibration of U.S.-Russia relations, which could indirectly impact RIC cohesion, particularly if U.S. policies further alienate Russia from Western alliances. Simultaneously, President Putin’s high-profile visit to China and his meeting with President Xi Jinping underscore the strengthening of the Sino-Russian strategic partnership, potentially narrowing the space for India to balance its position within the trio. Meanwhile, the bilateral meeting between Prime Minister Modi and Xi reflects both the possibilities and persistent limitations of India-China engagement, especially given their unresolved border disputes and strategic mistrust. Adding to the complexity, the imposition of a steep 50% tariff on Indian exports by the Trump administration has deepened India’s economic concerns, as the U.S. remains its largest export market. Such international pressures highlight India’s strategic dilemma: balancing its economic reliance on the West with its regional engagement through groupings like RIC. Ultimately, the future of RIC will depend not only on how well it adapts internally but also on how its member states navigate an increasingly fragmented global order where bilateral ties, economic imperatives, and security concerns often outweigh traditional multilateral loyalties. Jai Kumar Verma is a Delhi-based strategic analyst and member of United Services Institute of India and The Manohar Parrikar Institute for Defence Studies and Analyses,. The views in the article are solely the author’s. He can be contacted at editor.adu@gmail.com)